Vazquez-Santiago v. Commonwealth, 268 A.3d 16 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2022)

Overview:

In 2019, Isak Vazquez-Santiago was stopped and arrested on suspicion of DUI. Licensee was asked to submit to a blood test to determine his blood alcohol concentration, but allegedly refused. Under the typical circumstances, Vazquez-Santiago’s refusal would have resulted in him losing his driving privileges, under 75 Pa.C.S.§ 1547(b)(1). However, the court in this case found that Vazquez-Santiago’s refusal was not knowing and conscious because he lacked an understanding of the English language, and therefore did not understand the consequences of refusing. Because Vazquez-Santiago did not give a knowing and conscious refusal to submit to the blood test, his driving license was reinstated.

Expansion:

On June 24, 2019, a Harrisburg City Police Officer observed a vehicle commit several traffic violations, and subsequently initiated a traffic stop. The driver of the vehicle was identified to be Isak Vazquez-Santiago. Vazquez-Santiago was a Spanish-speaking individual, while the Officer was not. Throughout the encounter, Vazquez-Santiago was unable to understand the Officer’s questions and directions. For example, when the Officer asked Vazquez-Santiago to put down his window, confused, he opened the driver’s side door. The Officer then observed the odor of alcohol, and bloodshot, glossy eyes. After many verbal commands and hand signals, Vazquez-Santiago closed his door and rolled down his window. The Officer attempted to conduct standardized field sobriety tests, but ultimately none were performed because Vazquez-Santiago could not understand the Officer’s instructions. Vazquez-Santiago was placed under arrest on suspicion of DUI.

Vazquez-Santiago was transported to Dauphin County Booking Center. The Officer requested the assistance of a Spanish-speaking officer, but none were available to assist. The Officer asked Vazquez-Santiago to submit to a blood test, using hand signals. The Officer was allegedly under the impression that Vazquez-Santiago understood what he was asking, and then read him the implied consent form without the use of any hand signals. The implied consent form states that a “person’s operating privilege will be suspended upon refusal to submit to chemical testing . . . .” 75 Pa.C.S.§ 1547(b)(1). After the form was read, the Officer asked Vazquez-Santiago whether he would submit to the blood draw to which he answered “no.” He also refused to sign the implied consent form. The Officer assumed that Vazquez-Santiago was refusing to submit to the blood testing. However, at the hearing the Officer admitted he was unsure whether Vazquez-Santiago knew what was being asked of him or whether he understood the consequences of refusal.

At the hearing, Vazquez-Santiago testified on his own behalf with the assistance of an interpreter. He testified that he did not submit to the blood draw because he did not know what the Officer was saying to him. The trial court concluded Vazquez-Santiago did not give a knowing and conscious refusal, because he did not understand the consequences of refusing the blood test. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court recognized a language barrier may affect a driver’s ability to make a knowing and conscious blood test refusal. The trial court further ordered the reinstatement of Vazquez-Santiago’s driving privileges.

The Bureau of Driving Licensing (The Bureau) appealed the trial court’s decision. The main issue on appeal was whether Vazquez-Santiago’s language barrier prevented him from making a knowing and conscious refusal. In making its argument, The Bureau relied on a broad statement in the court’s opinion in Martinovic v. DOT, 881 A.2d 30 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2005). The statement said that it is inconsequential whether the licensee understands the implied consent warnings. Importantly, the court, in this case, outwardly rejected that notion. The court stated, “we disapprove of Martinovic’s comments regarding the significance, or lack thereof, of language barriers in this context.” The court agreed with the trial court that Vazquez-Santiago’s language barrier did prevent him from making a knowing and conscious refusal. The court reasoned that if it found that whether a licensee understands the implied consent warning to be inconsequential, then that would contradict the very purpose of the warnings.

It is important to note that a language barrier does not always result in the driver’s operating privileges being reinstated. The court does recognize two cases, Im v. Commonwealth, 529 A.2d 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) and Balthazarv. Commonwealth, 553 A.2d 1054 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989), where although English was not the drivers’ first language, the court still found the individuals made a conscious and knowing refusal. Although in those cases, the language barrier was not nearly as significant as in Vazquez-Santiago’s case. Significantly in Im and Balthazar, although English was not their first language, the drivers answered the Officer’s questions in English and testified without the use of an interpreter. The significant facts in Vazquez-Santiago’s case which resulted in both courts finding that he did not knowingly and consciously refuse to submit to the chemical test were:
(1) the arresting Officer expressed uncertainty as to whether Vazquez-Santiago understood the warnings and instructions given in English;

(2) he testified entirely through an interpreter;

(3) testified that he did not understand English; and

(4) he never answered any questions in English without at least hand signals.

Ultimately, whether a language barrier results in a driver’s consent being knowing and conscious depends on the facts of the specific case. Further, The Bureau has the ability to appeal the trial court’s finding that the driver did not knowingly and consciously refuse to submit to the test. Although, the Commonwealth Court gives discretion to the trial court’s findings of fact that because of the language barrier the refusal was not knowing and conscious.