Pennsylvania Superior Court Ruling: Commonwealth v. Murray

Com. v. Murray, J. No. 151 EDA 2019

The defendant in Commonwealth v. Murray was convicted of first degree murder and several attendant charges following a robbery whereby he shot and killed the victim. On appeal, the defendant raises several issues.

First, whether the trial court erred when it determined that the commonwealth did not improperly use its preemptory strikes in a discriminatory manner in violation of Batson. During the trial, each side was allowed 8 preemptory challenges. The prosecution uses 7 of their 8 challenges on African American or Hispanic jurors. Defense counsel objected and requested a race neutral reason for striking the jurors. The defense challenged these strikes under Batson. A Batson claim presents mixed questions of law and fact. The standard of review is whether the legal conclusions are correct and whether the factual findings are clearly erroneous. In Batson, the US Supreme Court held that a prosecutor’s challenge to a potential juror solely on the basis of race violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. When making a Batson challenge, the defendant must first make a prima facie showing that the witness was stricken due to their race. Upon that showing, the prosecutor must put forth their race neutral reason for striking the juror. In Pennsylvania, the defendant must make a record specifically identifying the race and gender of all potential jurors in the pool, the race and gender of all jurors remaining after for cause challenges, the race and gender of those removed by the commonwealth and the race and gender of the jurors who served and those where were acceptable to the Commonwealth but stricken by the defense. Here, the court found that the defendant failed to show a record of establishing purposeful discrimination. The defense did no more that point out the race of the stricken jurors and failed to establish the requirements on the record. Secondly, though it was likely not necessary for the prosecution to establish their race neutral reason for striking the juror as the defense failed to establish the required prima facie record, the court found that the prosecution had proper race neutral reasons for striking the jurors. Therefore, the defendant is not entitled to relief.

In his second claim, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding testimony that a detective involved in the case was later convicted with tampering or fabricating evidence in an unrelated homicide case. In criminal cases where a defendant attempts to impeach a police witness with evidence of prior misconduct, the courts have balanced the scales between probative and prejudicial evidence. The case law permits a police witness to be cross examined about misconduct as long as the wrongdoing is in some way related to the defendant’s underling criminal charges and establishes a motive to fabricate. However, if the police behavior is unrelated to the present matter and irrelevant, the trial court is permitted to restrict questioning on the incident. The Superior Court found that the trial court did not err in precluding the testimony. The court found that the evidence had very limited, if any, probative value and that its potential for prejudice outweighed that probative value. In his third issue, the defendant claims the court erred by permitting a detective to testify about a hearsay statement by the defendants girlfriend. The hearsay statement offered was that the defendants girlfriend told the officer that the defendant told her that he was in a fight. While the court concedes that this statement is in fact hearsay, the admission of the statement was harmless error. An error may be considered harmless where the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis, the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other, untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence, or the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict. In this case, the court found that the proof of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming and therefore the admission of the hearsay was insignificant and the error is harmless.

In his final argument, the defendant claims that the court erred by refusing to include an option on the verdict sheet for the jury to convict the defendant of conspiracy to commit third degree murder. The defendant cited no authority that permits the addition of a new charge to a verdict slip without a jury having been charged on that separate crime. Adding a new charge to the verdict without instructing the jury would likely have confused the jury in an already highly complex case. The court finds that the defendant is not entitled to any relief and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.