Pennsylvania Superior Court Ruling: Commonwealth v. Moose

Com. v. Moose, C., Jr. No. 1897 MDA 2014

In 1987, the defendant in Commonwealth v. Moose participated in the rape and murder of a woman in York County. In 1995, he entered a negotiated plea and pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, he was sentenced to a term of 15-30 years incarceration. In 1995, there were no laws or requirements for sexual offender registration and no registration requirements were included in his sentence.

In 2011, SORNA was enacted by the legislature, and the defendant was informed that he was now considered a tier 3 offender and would be subject to lifetime registration requirements. In 2014, the defendant filed a pro se motion asking the court to enforce his negotiated plea agreement and enjoin any requirement that he register as a sex offender. The trial court denied his motion. He then appealed to the Superior court where the opinion of the trial court was affirmed. He then petitioned for allowance for appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Some procedural background is necessary to understand the posture of this case so its important to note that in 2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided the Muniz case which found that SORNA’s registration requirements were punitive in nature and therefore violated ex post facto principles who applied to individuals who, like defendant, committed an offense before the effective date of SORNA I.

In light of the Muniz opinion, the Supreme Court granted the defendants motion and remanded the case to be reconsidered in light of Muniz. Meanwhile, SORNA II took effect. SORNA II divided registrants into 2 distinct subchapters depending on when the offense was committed. In 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided the Lacombe case. The Lacombe case stood for two important principles – first, that the petitioner is not required to challenge his sex offender registration status within the confines of the PCRA, and second, that subchapter I is non punitive and does not violate ex post facto laws. Subchapter I registration includes cases that occurred between 1996, but before 2012, or were required to register under a former registration law and their registration requirements had not yet expired. In reviewing this case, the court, after finding that Lacombe is dispositive that this case need not be addressed in the PCRA, considers the effect of his plea bargain on his obligation to register as a sex offender.

The law regarding plea bargains is well established. Plea bargaining is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system. Accordingly, it is critical that plea agreements are enforced, to avoid any possible perversion of the plea-bargaining system. In reviewing all the case law, the court holds that a defendant negotiated guilty plea precludes subsequent application of a punitive registration scheme because it would effectively alter the defendant’s agreed-upon sentence. This is so even where a negotiated plea agreement is silent regarding sex offender registration. Moreover, where a defendant pleads guilty in exchange for a specific sentence, he is entitled to the benefit of that bargain. However, when a registration scheme is not punitive, it constitutes a collateral consequence of a guilty plea. Because non-punitive registration requirements are not criminal punishment, they would not materially alter a negotiated term establishing a defendant’s criminal sentence. The court finds that application of SORNA I is a punitive sanction and therefore cannot be enforced against the defendant. However, the trial court has not addressed defendants claims against SORNA II and therefore the case is remanded to determine if he would be required to register under SORNA II.